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THE SOCIALCONSTRUCTION OF
EMOTIONS:
NEW DIRECTIONS FROM CULTURE THEORY

E Doyle McCarthy

INTRODUCTION

'!

A majority of sociologists and many other social scientists working in emotion
studies identify their work with the approach called "social constructionism."
However, there is a fairly wide range of perspectives and working assumptions
that this term encompasses, almost to the point where the term no longer clearly
identifies where one stands on such basic matters as defIningemotions, studying
emotions, and how preciselyemotions are sociallycircumscribed. Furthermore,
this approach is coming to mean things other than it did when sociologists began
to map out the terrain of the sociology of emotions more than a decade ago.
After a brief elaboration of these points, I will examine where the social
constructionist approach appears to be moving in sociology and related fIelds.
In the course of this examination, I will also explain why these directions have
far-reaching implications for sociology. To anticipate the direction I am
headed, it is my view that constructionists

will be taking their lead from "culture

theory," a term that designates a diversity of new studies from
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humanities and social science, whose focus is the interpretation of culture and
its operations (e.g., Munch and Smelser 1992; Alexander and Seidman 1990;
Denzin 1992)and which represents a revolution of sorts in the ways that social
scientists conceptualize and study their objects of inquiry. Culture theory has
already begun to alter how emotions are conceptualized. But its future impact
on the sociology of emotions promises to be considerable.

EARLYCONSTRUCTIONIST APPROACHES
Constructionism's most prominent feature is an emphasis (one that varies
considerably from study to study) on cognitive and cultural features of emotion.
This emphasis it shares with many cognitive psychologists working in emotions
and with those identified with the social constructionist movement in
psychology (Gergen 1985; Gergen and Davis 1985; Averill 1980, 1982, 1986;
Harre 1986),as well as with a number of works in cultural anthropology (e.g.,
Lutz 1988;Shweder and leVine 1984) and philosophy (de Sousa 1987;Rorty
1980; Solomon 1984).
In most cases, proponents of this approach argue that emotions cannot be
divorced from the sociocultural meanings in which they are experienced and
expressed. That is, while we can analytically distinguish emotions from bodily
and cognitive functions and processes, emotions are in fact best grasped as
objects of investigation within the domain of cultural forms and meanings.
Furthermore, constructionists argue that the linkages of affect and cultural
form are vital for both conceptualizing emotions and for studying their
operations. It is in this sense that emotions cannot be divorced from a whole
host of cultural and social phenomena: from language in the form of words,
from what Austin (1962) first described as "speech acts," from "vocabularies
of emotion" (Geertz 1959)or the rules governing expression and feeling, from
the idioms (both pretheoretical and theoretical) within which they are
experienced and expressed (and the degrees of refinement each of these take),
and from the cultural patterns and interactional processes within which they
emerge and are sustained (Gordon 1990). In each of these different senses,
emotions are described as cognitive and' evaluative phenomena, even as
"language forms" (Perinbanayagam 1992),for they communicate and "signal"
things about self and society in the larger sense of these terms, or in the
immediate, situational sense of, say, Goffman's "interaction order" (1983).
Steven Gordon (1981,1989), one of the very first to systematize a sociology
of emotions, identified what he termed the "socially emergent properties of
emotion that transcend psychological or physiological explanation."
Reasoning as Durkheim did, these emergent dimensions, he argued, are
explicable only in relation to other social phenomena. Emotions combine
features of body, gesture, and cultural meaning. The sociology-of-emotions
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project involves how emotions are differentiated, socialized, and managed
socially. Today, Gordon's thinking can be seen as representative of a number
of different constructionist approaches, each viewing emotions as inextricably
social or cultural, precisely because they are emergent properties of social
relations and sociocultural processes.
Despite this emphasis, sociologists do not usually go as far as to defme
emotions entirely as cognitive categories, or to deny'what is distinctive about
the domain of human feeling and emotionality. Hochschild's work (1983, pp.
201-22),for example, is explicitly critical of those who subsume emotion under
other categories. However, in some cases, approaches appear to do precisely
this and verge on a kind of cognitive reductionism where the processes of
human understanding and evaluation in which emotio~s play a vital and
formative role, are reduced to conceptual schemes. (See a discussion of this
by Gergen and Gergen 1987,p. 43.) To date, most constructionists, and people
of other persuasions too, would agree that there is strong support inside and
outside social science for distinguishing emotion and cognition, while at the
same time stating that emotions are vital players at every step and in every
aspect of human knowledge and understanding. Again, this is not to equate
emotion and cognition, nor to reduce emotion to cognition. Emotions are not
merely cognitive functions. At the same time emotions are inextricably cultural
(which is not the same thing). Perhaps this last point is best stated by Catherine
Lutz (1988, p.5) who argues that emotional experience "is not precultural but
preeminently cultural."
Constructionist approaches can also be identified by what they oppose or
reject. Most notably these include a view of emotions as physiological states
or as natural objects. Alternatively, emotions or emotional processes (including
experiences, meanings of experiences, expression, and so forth) are best
construed as acts or as kinds of symbolic actions, as social performances or,
in Averill's terms (1986, p.l 00), "cultural performances" or "socially constituted
syndromes," response elements that involve both cognitive and physical
processes. Each of these formulations are intentionally employed to provide
alternative views of emotions as principally bodily, experiential, or irrational
phenomena.
But whether concerned with identifying what emotions are and how to study
them or how emotions and cognition are related, the early debates addressed
(explicitly or implicitly) the question: How much does culture matter? (see
Thoits 1989, p. 319). While this question has represented sociology's approach
to emotion until now, I think that soon there will be a new direction taken
by constructionists, one in which the question willbe, How does culture matter?
I also expect that more of us will be divided in the years to come as this issue
becomes the defining issue of social constructionism as it is in U.S. sociology.
This is because social science today is distinguished by a rethinking of what
culture is, how it is construed, and how its operations are studied. The
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disciplines most responsible for facilitating these changes are literary studies,
cultural anthropology, studies of popular culture, and what Lynn Hunt (1989)
calls the "new cultural history." These newer ventures into cultural studies have
moved many of us to examine the conceptual implications of structuralism
and semiotics. With them, greater attention is given to studies of forms of
signifying-institutions, texts, images, ideologies, and so forth. Slowly our view
of culture is undergoing change-a change that already signifies further change
in the assumptions and presuppositions that have distinguished our discipline
since its inception. Yesterday's "attitude of analysis" (Ricoeur 1986, pp. 25556) was causal and explanatory and its privileged model was natural science.
Today's attitude is increasingly interpretive and conversational and seeks to
enlarge the universe of human discourse, "an aim to which a semiotic concept
of culture is peculiarly well adapted" (Geertz 1973, p. 14). The semiotic study
of culture is directed toward the study of symbolic and signifying systems
through which a social order is communicated and reproduced.

RETHINKING CULTURE AND EMOTION
As a semiotic process, culture is no longer seen as a "secondary formation"
(Sahlins 1976) of social structure, social organization, and material life.
Construed that way, which it has been throughout our discipline's history, the
operations of culture were necessarily undermined and restricted. Culture,
principally ideational, hung lightly, like gossamer, over hard material reality.
Causality began in that solid and practical base of the economy or "social
structure. "
The age of structuralism and semiotics has shown that society is an
assemblage of signs to be deciphered.'nothing exists outside of these signifying
systems-neither material life. forces of production. and certainly not the
enterprises of science and social science. themselves and their objects. cultural
forms and forces. The legacy of structuralism is the view that language and
other cultural forms do not follow reality but signify it (Clark 1985 p., 188).
The key problems then become how to make intelligible the operations of
language and cultural meanings that underlie this or that aspect of reality; how
the objects of our studies say things about a society; how they operate as
signifying systems in their own right. Emotions are no exception.
Cultural studies emphasize the autonomy of culture from social structure,
meaning cultural forms cannot be read or disciphered from social behavior
or social organization. They are patterns in their own right. Among other
things, they cannot be explained deductively by reference to a set of factors
that are outside of culture. Accordingly, emotions do not exist as something
apart from the cultural forms that describe them. For there are no "natural
objects" of inquiry (Hunt 1989, p. 7). Emotions are cultural objects; they have
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meaning within a system of relations. They "unfold in a world already
symbolized" and are constructed as what they are "by the concept" we have
ofthem, to borrow Marshall Sahlins's terms (1976, p. 123).Or, as "discursive
objects," emotions emerge within a discourse, an organization of written and
spoken forms, areas of language-use identified by particular historical groups
and institutions-the discourses of professions like psychology and medicine,
but also academic and theoretical discourses such as philosophy and literary
studies, or metatheoretical discourses such as liberal humanism. The "truths"
about emotions, the self, and so forth are contained within the operations of
these discourses and are, in turn, experienced on the pretheoreticallevel by
the subjects who live them as "truths." In this way, language and discourse
are both the foundation and the instruments of the social construction of
subjective and objective reality (Berger 1970, p. 376).
The new theories of culture also set clear limits to inquiries into causes and
into universal foundations, but they also undermine phenomenological views
of subjectivity, since subjectivity itself is always given form and voice through
discourse. Accordingly, language categories and cultural meanings are no
longer viewed "subjectively." They share, in Richard Harland's words, "a kind
of objectivity which is not the objectivity of things, [they share] a kind of idea
which is not the idea of a subjective mind" (1987, p. 68). Far more significant,
it is culture theory that allows us to examine how our own "languages" of
selfhood and our own Western proclivity to divide up our worlds (and
ourselves) into "subjects" and "objects," also implies a distinct idiom of
emotion, one, incidentally, that is enshrined in our philosophies, psychologies,
and social scientific categories.

THE NEW SHAPE OF EMOTION STUDIES
What might some of this mean for emotion studies? How will our second
decade of work be characterized? I do not expect discontinuity as much as
a gradual but remarkable change in our empirical dispositions as culture theory
comes to guide our thinking and research. As it does, our research willno longer
focus on emotions themselves, but on the discursive operations that constitute
our "emotional lives. II the cultural practices through which emotions are
known. controlled. released. cultivated. and worked on.
The emphasis on psychological phenomena as forms of discourse, has
already inspired the works of many in both psychology and the social sciences
(Perinbanayagam 1992;Shotter and Gergen 1989).But I expect that the studies
of "emotionology" (Steams and Steams 1986), of "ethnopsychology" (Lutz
1988), and of "emotional culture" (Gordon 1989), terms identified with
pioneering works in our field, will be given even greater emphasis and
elaboration.
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Two areas of social science where culture theory will undoubtedly affect our
work in emotions will be in the areas of popular culture and politics (the latter,
broadly conceived). Studies of popular culture willtake on a greater importance
in our work since the domain of culture is no longer construed holistically,
but as cultural practices. The widespread use today of "cultural practices" is
significant in several respects. First, as a term its intention is to locate "culture"
in acts or practices dispersed throughout the social order, in what used to be
called formal and informal institutional
settings. Rather than in
"consciousness" or in non-material social facts as traditionally conceived,
culture is observable in practices.
"Cultural practices" in today's social science also connotes a relatively
disorderly sociocultural universe in contrast to "culture" which implied a
shared universe of meaning. "Cultural practices" are neither unified nor
universal. They reveal a collective sense of difference, a various and disparate
social reality, manifest in the range and the types of signifying systems from
written texts of popular press and journalism to film, television, videos, and
photographs, and to the varied fields of discourse used, say, within the
institutions and regimes of business, police work, and medicine-what Stuart
Hall has called the "heterogeneity of discourses" (1980), the multivarious
languages and practices through which we come to understand what is real
for us and for others with whom we live and act.
Difference is also manifest in the forms and numbers of written and spoken
texts that provide us with an ongoing sense of our everyday worlds and of
the realities that make those worlds up. Today's "culture" is diverse, many
layered, and multicoded. And because of that, it is accessible for study in many
forms and sites: in practitioners' settings, in family photos, in romance novels,
in forms of talk, and in sports arenas just as it is enshrined in our laws, doctrines,
our sciences and our literary texts. In the words of Raymond Williams (1981,
p. 12-13), an early proponent of this position:
'cultural practice' and 'cultural production
are not simply derived from an otherwise
constituted social order but are themselves major elements in its constitution... it sees
culture as the signifying system through which necessarily (though among other means)
a social order is communicated, reproduced. experienced and explored.

As a concept, "cultural practices" does not descriminate between official and
unofficial domains or between "high" and "low" forms of cultural production.
Accordingly, today's cultural studies are occupied in whatever fields and sites
of cultural production there are, giving rise to studies of the observable
properties of knowledges and symbols in texts, modes of communication, and
forms of speech linked to specific institutional frameworks. Cultural practices
are both disparate and diverse, available for study in different sites and settings:
TV studios, scientific laboratories, medical clinics, bedrooms, schoolrooms,
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therapists' offices, revealing this new heterogeneous conception of what culture
is and how it operates.
Following the lead of studies of popular culture, I expect that emotion studies
will gather its data in those many cultural sites and domains that resonate with
emotional themes. And like many of the new studies of popular culture
(Mukerji and Schudson 1991), I expect that sociologists of emotions will
explore these sites as arenas where serious cultural dramas are played (and
fought) out: TV talk shows and TV tabloids which serve up parades of
forbidden and titillating social types or where scandalous "personalities" have
their day in court; the settings of sports events and rock and rap concerts where
emotional excitementis scriptedand played out (Elias and Dunning 1986).
"Emotional cultures" will be examined through support groups, advice
columns, self-help books, tabloids, the culture of New Age, and the
controversies over the recent censorship of museum displays and CD releases.
It is noteworthy that the first decade of emotion studies found sociologists
missing from many of the sites of collective political and social events. I am
thinking particularly of events of cultural production and heightened emotional
display like parades and political marches, large prayer meetings and religious
conventions, scenes of natural and manmade disasters, and sports events like
Superbowls (both the game and the massive celebrity displays of halftime).
And what of that unique American cultural form the political convention? It
has become (What was it before?) a slick and smooth blending of the cognitive
and the emotional: a musical theater that assumes the form of a rational
discourse while manifesting clear signs of an orgy of emotional display and
manipulation. Its cognitive aspect also evident in the highly technical
transmission of political rhetoric and narrative told via microphone and giant
screen. Its procession of human emblems of womanhood, manhood, family
values, national values is simultaneously geared to the manufacture of emotion
through a cultural performance marked by a cult of celebrity laced with
nostalgia for bygone days. Most recently, political conventions have come to
serve as grand occasions for the enactment of "identity politics" for revelling
in the victories and defeats of those with whom we feel "the same" and those
whom we wish to exclude (de Swaan 1992).
Owing principally to the work of Michel Foucault, recent works in cultural
studies have also come to share a concern with power, with a material and
spatial view of the operations of power: with actual sites of power ("A whole
history remains to be written of spaces-which would at the same time be the
history of powers," Foucault 1980, p. 149.) and with the regulatory power of
knowledge. Foucault's works speak to scholars in emotion studies, for it was
he who first traced how "technologies of power" materially penetrate the body,
the psyche, the emotions, how power operates to reproduce normal bodies,
emotions, and psyches. Abram de Swaan's case studies reported in his book,
The Management of Normality (1990), while more indebted to Norbert Elias
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than to Foucault's notion of normalization through control, effectively
addresses the politics involved in the treatment and management of emotions
in medical contexts. Providing a cultural approach to emotion studies that is
dynamic and historical, de Swaan uses a sociogenetic approach that is equally
at home in psychoanalysis and in critical theory.
Until recently, sociologists of emotion have been remarkably silent about
issues of both power and politics, more inclined to study the emotional
interplay of micro worlds or to observe the realm of "subjectivi ties. " Yet social
and political events and movements today are ripe with emotional themes
and are steeped in the political: social movements that American journalists
call "identity politics" (Blumenthal 1992; cf. Aronowitz 1992), where group
politics are patently aligned with the project of an identity based on ethnicity,
race, gender, or "sexual-orientation," and with issues of the body such as
abortion politics, and movements linked to current ideologies of selfhood,
what Anthony Giddens (1991, p. 214) calls "life politics" and the ethos of
self-growth. Life politics, Giddens writes, "concerns political issues which
flow from processes of self-actualization in post-traditional contexts, where
globalizing influences intrude deeply into the reflexive project of the self,
and conversely where processes of self-realization influence global
strategies." Demonstrations today involving abortion rights and pro-life
politics and political movements of groups (of class, nation, ethnicity, or race)
seeking to affirm and to achieve political and personal recognition are some
of the sociocultural sites where political passions are mobilized, passions
whose intensity require multifaceted sociological inquiries to account for
them, inquiries that examine how human identifications are structured and
restructured socially and politically, moving between intense primary bonds
of family and the "grand identifications" of nation and race (de Swaan 1992;
cf. Anderson 1983/1991; Calhoun 1991).
Giddens (1991, pp. 217-18) contends that in the present social and political
context it is difficult to distinguish "life-political" identity issues and concerns,
and concerns focused on the body. For today, neither the body nor one's
identity are commonly viewed as natural objects. Today, both are increasingly
subject to discursive practices and reflexive action (self-help texts and
techniques, therapies, exercise machinery and manuals, sex changes, plastic
surgery for breasts and noses, organ transplants). The embodied self has
become "a site of interaction," worked on by the techniques and the
practitioners of high modernity. "The body itself," Giddens writes, "as
mobilised in praxis-becomes more immediately relevant to the identity the
individual promotes" (1991, p. 218) or an identity promoted by a society. The
body is that last (and best?) domain of privacy and secrecy, that site of
emancipatory

p. 191):

acts and politics, that Western "code" of pleasure (Foucault 1980,
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this systematisation of pleasure according to the 'laws' of sex gave rise to the whole
apparatus of sexuality. And it is this that makes us believe that we arc 'liberating. ourselves
when we 'decode' all pleasure in terms of sex shorn at last of disguise. .. .

EMOTIONS AS
" SOCIAL OBJECTS
Developments in emotion studies and culture theory have also opened up a
wide range of developments in contemporary U.S. culture that reveal the
preeminent place of emotions as motive forces in people's lives. The
sociocultural context of these developments runs through the mainstream of
contemporary life-the landscape of high modernity-and the reflexive
features built into virtually all of its apects: our particular forms of selfhood,
particularly the unfolding and seemingly unchartered and ungrounded domain
of people's identities, about which so much has been recently written (e.g.,
Aronowitz 1992; Gergen 1991; Giddens 1991; Lash and Friedman 1992). It
is not an overstatement to claim that virtually all of the cultural developments
with which emotion studies should be concerned, return to the problem of
identity or self-identity. For feelings and emotions have come to serve as one
of the principal experiences of self-validation, as the moorings, the moral and
spiritual resources, from which to claim an identity and to build a selfconception. While an analysis of the social and political sources that underlie
these developments is clearly beyond the scope of this paper, they are manifest
in the broadest features of industrial capitalism and its secularizing thrust, and
in the rise of what we moderns (and postmoderns) have come to call "personal
life," the seemingly private domain of living where a sense of identity "built
up," yet also "discovered," involves an attendant and similarly fashioned
"emotional life."Within high modernity, the emotions have become preeminent
objectifications of subjective experience, precious vehicles for rendering one's
life and one's identity meaningful.
In the terms of social science,emotions are "social objects" (McCarthy 1989),
having a two-fold capacity: first, as objects, they are referred to and acted
toward; second, as signs in their own right, they can be used to signifysomething
to selfor to others, to "make statements" or to be used as props in the enactment
of a role, to be signifying objects. All social objects have this dual capacity to
serveas objects of action and as signsthat enable action to proceed. Accordingly,
emotions not only serve as objects of elaborate social ritual and practice, but
emotions also serve as signs of who and what we are, as things we handle in
our presentation of self. Freud (1923) and, most recently, Hochschild (1983)
have written extensively about this signal function of emotions.
Turner (1976) and, more recently, Benton (1993) have described the
contemporary tendency to value particular roles and actions that signify a
"true" or genuine or impulsive selfwhere "inner" or "deep" states, needs, desires,
emotions, and impulses are articulated or expressed. Emotions, these authors
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argue, have acquired a distinctly contemporary meaning where feelings of
anger, depression, sexual longing, guilt, and so forth, have become significant
objects of attention and action; emotions are "worked at" and "worked on,"
one has an "emotional life." Emotions are vital aspects with which the self
establishes or discovers its authenticity; emotions have become a "language"
in which the self discloses and confirms its identity.
In the terms and perspectives of culture theory, emotions and the identities
they disclose are preeminently cultural phenomena, for they can only be
grasped within the cultural systems and social worlds in which they are
experienced and known, the political and religious systems, the various
discourses, the collective practices, and the forms of selfhood that prevail. For
it is in and through these cultural systems that emotions have come into being
as something, that is, as objects of our experiences that mean something, and
as a differentiated system of signs with which the self engages. To know how
and what we feel, to be conscious of emotional experiences is, to cite Walker
Percy (1958), to be "conscious of something being something." And this always
returns us to the system of culture in which any object-an emotion, a person,
an event-is known as something.

CONCLUSION
When the sociology of emotions was begun about a decade ago, social
constructionism epitomized the approach of those who were calling for an
autonomous sociological perspective on self and emotion. It was quickly
discovered that this project, which bore a striking and substantive resemblance
to similar projects in psychology and anthropology, needed to refine the
concept of culture, particularly Clifford Geertz's (1973, p. 89) influential
formulation of culture as the symbols and meanings people use for
communicating and perpetuating their knowledge about life, in all its aspects.
Sociology's "autonomous" or distinctly social view of emotions, it turned out,
moved many of us into close proximity with anthropology and theories of
language. The point was to learn more about the operations of culture, the
cultural and discursive practices that articulate emotions and the self. In the
process, we have learned much more about our initial claim that emotions,
like the self, are social constructs. Today, it is the newer studies in culture theory

that push us further along the tracks we once designated as "social
constructionism." Culture theory invites the sociologist to explicate the
particular cultural and ideologicalcontexts in whichemotions are identified
and constituted, the institutional and discursive moorings within which
emotions and the self are experienced as what they really are, that is, how they
are collectively thought and known to be and how they are supposed to be
felt. Accordingly, emotions are neither strictly personal features of individuals
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nor universal natural objects. Emotions are "preeminently cultural" (Lutz 1988,
p.5) and, therefore, subject to social and political forces that render them
"natural" (Crapanzano 1992, p. 12). The point then is not how much culture
matters. For culture does not constitute emotions by degree. The point is how
culture m.atters.For culture is the assemblange of those discourses within which
emotions come to be.
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